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M E M O R A N D U M

concerning Germany's attitude towards Denmark before and during the occupation, prepared at the request of the Allies for use at the preparation of the bill of indictment against the German war criminals to be brought before the International Military Tribunal.

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The Danish people had during the peace period of 76 years which had passed since the assault of Prussia and Austria in 1864 in peaceful co-operation with all nations built a well regulated and prosperous community, when she was again brutally assaulted by the Germans on the 9th April, 1940.

The Royal Danish Government had to capitulate to the overwhelming power of the German armed forces, and the whole country has since then been exposed to the will of the occupation authorities for five years.

Germany's attitude towards Denmark before and during the occupation will be dealt with in this Memorandum under the following headings:

I. Pre-war infiltration.

II. Entering into treaties without meaning to observe them.

III. Launching wars of aggression.

IV. After invasion, terrorization, economic spoliation etc.

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I.

PRE-WAR INFILTRATION.

It is a matter of difficulty to make a statement on the German infiltration policy against Denmark, partly because prior to the occupation the danger of these phenomena was not fully realized, and partly because all the evidence concerning them was compiled by the Danish security police and subsequently destroyed by the German police when on September 19th, 1944, the Danish police was abolished. Further, it has not as yet been possible by examination of the numerous persons arrested belonging to the fifth column to obtain evidence adequate to give a full picture of the German infiltration policy in Denmark.

In the following it is therefore only attempted by way of examples to give a summary of the ways in which the infiltration was attempted and the objects at which it aimed.

a. German Intelligence Activities in Denmark prior to the Occupation.

This activity has no doubt been of far greater extent than indicated by the considerable number of cases in which the guilty parties were apprehended and convicted.

In most of the cases of military espionage known to the Danish police it could not be proved that the espionage was directed against Denmark, and the persons concerned were therefore only convicted of having assisted in German intelligence service on Danish territory directed against other countries. This was clearly evident in the case of the German spy, Poul Georg Fidrmuc, of the German military intelligence, who had been notified to the Danish Foreign Ministry as foreign correspondent to the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", and who under cover of this business passed on regular military intelligence. Further, the well known espionage organization. the leader of which was an ex-

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commander in the German navy, Horst Gustav Friederich von Pflugk-Harttung, was directed also against interests outside of Denmark. The object of the organization was to collect intelligence of military importance, especially as regards the presence of foreign men-of-war and military aircraft on or close to Danish territory and Danish and foreign mine barrages in Danish waters and to pass on this information to the German intelligence service.

But there are several cases indicating the activities of the German police and other intelligence services in Denmark. Among them was the case against the German-Nazi, Danish subject Thomas Edlef Jorgensen of Aabenraa, who - on previous application to a local editor regarding the sale of German military secrets - against consideration undertook to obtain information concerning the attitude towards Germany of various persons residing in Denmark for the use of the German intelligence service. By way of another example of German intelligence service which, at any rate, apparently had no military object, may be mentioned that the German-born Julius Gustav Adolf Schumacher, a secretary in the office of the commissioners of taxes and excise, at the beginning of 1940 was sentenced to imprisonment for having procured information as to the status of private Danish and foreign individuals, partly by an abuse of his official position to procure such information and partly by receiving information from agents in Norway and Holland.

The cases affording the best illustration of this German activity in Denmark, are, however, those in which attempts were made to obtain information as to German immigrants.

At New Year 1938-39 the Copenhagen Police received information indicating that in Denmark there was an intelligence organization aiming at procuring information concerning foreigners residing in this country which in its activities

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made use of especially unlawful methods. A number of arrests were made, and through the evidence obtained in the course of the investigation, the police succeeded in getting to the bottom of the activities of the organization. Thus, during the period from 1936 to 1938 the Nazi lawyer, Mr. Pontoppidan, who had previously been temporarily employed by the Danish police, forwarded information of various kinds mostly on emigrants from Germany. A detailed statement was given of the activities of such emigrants and of their connections. Information was, however, also sought as to citizens of other countries, who were either residents in Denmark for some length of time or who were passing through Denmark in transit, if it were presumed that the activities of such foreigners might be directed against Germany. In some cases information was also given as regards Danish subjects, mainly Danish politicians and policemen. For the collection of this information the leader had a circle of persons, the exact number of which was never quite ascertained. The gathering of information was technically well organized, without regard to the laws of the country. Thus, the parties concerned did not desist from burgling an emigrant office, and in several cases they forcibly broke into private residences and offices where documents were photographed or copied. Members of the organization had likewise installed a microphone in an emigrant office, and the telephone conversations of the Russian Commercial Delegation were intercepted by a very elaborate and technically unique device.

As mentioned above it may be taken for granted that the Danish police have been able to clear up only a small fraction of the cases of German espionage and intelligence activities prior to the occupation. The knowledge of local conditions and especially of technical matters evinced by the German troops occupying the country is a fact. This

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knowledge, combined with the aid, in giving directions etc. rendered by the 5th column, which facilitated the operation of the German troops and impeded the defence, can have been obtained only through an extensive espionage. It must be presumed that this espionage to a great extent has been carried on through official German representatives, cultural and propaganda institutions, and by the aid of Germans residing in Denmark.

Several Germans who had resided or stayed in Denmark proved to be employed by the "Wehrmacht" or other organizations belonging to the occupation authorities. In this connection may be mentioned, that it has with a reasonable degree of certainty been established that General Kaupisch who led the attack on Denmark on April 9th, 1940, and who has maintained to the Danish Press that the order for the occupation came as a surprise to him and that he had only once, when a young lieutenant been in Denmark, actually stayed in Denmark under a false name in November-December, 1939.

b. The German Propaganda Centres, etc.

When the national-socialistic party had assumed power in Germany, a department of the party was established in Denmark, which under the name of "N.S.D.A.P. Ausland Organisation, Landeskreis Dänemark" admitted German citizens residing in Denmark to membership.

The "Ausland" organization belonged to the German Foreign Office and attempted to attach all Germans residing abroad to the party and to ensure that they were ready to work actively in the building up of the German Volksbund abroad. The work of the organization was facilitated by the fact that since 1937 all German citizens residing abroad were ordered to report to their consulate. The President in Denmark was a Cavalry Captain, Daniel Ernst Schäfer, who at the time of the occupation of Denmark proved to be an

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"Abwehr" officer, and who is now an allied prisoner of war. As President of a propaganda division for the German national-socialism appeared the Press Attaché at the German Legation, Karl Frielitz, who was born at Haderslev, and who formerly was chairman of the "Ausland" organization, and who also proved to be an officer of the German intelligence service at Copenhagen. The party had no official publication and on the whole acted on the quiet up to the time of the occupation, but from then on it endeavoured to get all German societies and institutions in Denmark under its control and gradually succeeded in doing so.

Among these institutions may especially be mentioned the "Deutsche Akademie", a forerunner of the "Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Institut" established during the occupation. The "Deutsche Akademie", the object of which was to increase German influence abroad, acted in Denmark by linguistic and cultural courses and worked for an interchange of Danish and German students. At any rate in one case it has been established that a study sojourn has been applied to intelligence purposes.

Further may be mentioned the Dano-German Chamber of Commerce established in 1936, the object of which was to promote trade between Denmark and Germany and which received a subsidy from the "Reichswirtschaftskammer" of the German Ministry of Trade. As general secretary it got in 1939 a German Nazi, who had previously been attached to the Finnish-German chamber of commerce. He was by the N.S.D.A.P. appointed also "Wissenschaftstelleleiter der Landesgruppe Dänemark" and in this capacity he endeavoured even before the occupation to carry through an "arisefication" (purging of Jews) in the houses representing German firms in this country, and already at that time a certain amount of commercial espionage seems to have been going on. Already one week after the occupation he was, thus, able to submit to the German "Wehrmacht" a detailed statement of the stocks

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of petrol in Denmark and a list of the firms by which it was stored. The activities of the chamber of commerce is at present being subjected to a detailed investigation, the result of which it is so far impossible to produce. Also through the press and culture divisions of the German Legation, through the UFA Film, Ltd., and the News agencies "STB" and "Meteor Press" which were all under the control of the German spy Horst Gilbert, attempts were made to prepare the soil for Nazism.

Further may be mentioned the "Nordische Gesellschaft" which had its headquarters at Lübeck and a branch office at Copenhagen. The organization issued monthly reports on German-Nordic collaboration and arranged annual congresses in Germany to which representatives of Danish commerce, industries and science, etc. were invited. The last president in Denmark of the organization was the above-mentioned cavalry captain Ernst Schäfer, who had previously been Landesgruppeleiter of the afore-mentioned department of the German Nazi party. On several occasions, Schäfer, who was a correspondent to the "Völkischer Beobachter" and several other German papers, made hateful attacks on Denmark in these papers as well as in lectures in the "Nordische Gesellschaft", and cast doubts on the neutrality of Denmark. As "Landesgruppeleiter" he further made himself notorious by sending out questionnaires to the German colony, asking about the military and military-technical training of the "Reich" Germans, whether they owned motor cars, motorcycles, etc.

Apart from the land purchases in Southern Jutland which will be mentioned in the following, there has probably not been any material German expansion in Denmark during the years prior to the occupation with a view to securing an economic hegemony. The establishment of various German activities, such as e.g. "automat" caffees in Copenhagen must to a greater or lesser extent be considered to have

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afforded a cover for German intelligence service both as regards political, commercial and military intelligence.

With regard to the organizations under this heading, mention shall now only be made of the "Deutsche Fichtebund", of Hamburg, which was under the direct leadership of the German Ministry of Propaganda. This information agency which operated under no less than 8 different addresses in Hamburg, stated about itself in one of the pamphlets it issued, that it had been founded in January, 1914 in memory of the German philosopher Fichte, and that it was to be regarded as a union for world truth. Its objects were stated to be the furtherance of mutual understanding by the gratuitous issue of information of the new Germany, and the protection of culture and civilization by propagating the truth of the destructure powers of the world. The greater part of that stream of nazi-propaganda pamphlets which in 1939 continued to pour across the Danish frontier emanated from this organization. This German propaganda had as its major and most obvious aim the preparation of a national sentiment in Denmark favourable to Germany and inimical to England, but might also serve to express an attempt to prepare the soil for an introduction into Denmark of a nazistic Government by collecting through underground work Danish statements of dissatisfaction with the democratic regime in Denmark for use as documentary evidence in connection with a subsequent "Liberation" action. In January 1940 the propaganda thus did not confine itself to attacks on England and English warfare and Jews and Jewish mentality, but extended to serious attacks on the mentality of the Danish Government and Parliament. This propaganda was, however, especially dangerous, because the printed matter was probably used as a medium for getting into touch with suitable, prospective informers for the German intelligence service.

At the beginning of 1940 the Danish Legation at Berlin

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stated that it had reason to suppose that at any rate part of the propaganda distributed by the "Fichtebund" was compiled under the auspices of the "Auswärtiges Amt". That the "Fichtebund" also was active in the intelligence service was proved at the trial of a criminal case in Norway against a person indicted for shipping espionage, who in January 1940 through German intervention had been employed by a shipping company at Bergen and had furnished the German intelligence service with confidential information on Norwegian vessels in convoys.

Besides the propaganda through printed matter thus made to create a fifth column, propaganda was doubtless also carried on by personal application, especially in business circles. In this connection may be mentioned that a German citizen named Wiegert at the end of February, 1940 was arrested and found to be in possession of a document - "Propagandavorschlag für Dänemark", which contained proposals for an intensified propaganda for Germany. In this connection the document summarized the possibilities for increased work especially on the part of the newspapers, the attitude of the individual papers and the prospects of attaining influence over them being evaluated. The following passage is typical of the contents: "Die Tagespresse sollte von der Gesandtschaft und ihren Mitarbeitern im Zaum gehalten werden können". ('The Legation and its collaborators should be able to keep the Press under control").

c. <u>The Danish Nazis as a Fifth Column.</u>

During the period following 1933 numerous national-socialistic parties cropped up in Denmark, most of them were, however, very short-lived and only one - that of Fritz Clausen "The National Socialist Party of Denmark" obtained representation in the Danish Parliament. The various parties and factions were always fighting among eaoh other, inter alia, on the question of relations with Germany. It must be pre-

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sumed that several of these small parties have received not only spiritual inspiration but also material aid from Germany and also received material support - by way of loans of films etc. - from the Cultural Division of the German Legation in Copenhagen. Fritz Clausen's party, however, came to play the principal part as fifth column during the occupation. Fritz Clausen established close relations with the Legation, and during the first year of the occupation the party constituted an actual danger. On the party's relations with Germany prior to the occupation may be said that both Fritz Clausen and members of the party with great diligence participated in party days at Nürnberg and Streicher congresses at Erfurt, and that, at any rate Fritz Clausen had a rather intimate connection in the German Foreign Office. It must be presumed that during the years after 1936 the party had received material German support also for the paper "Fædrelandet' which in October 1939 was removed from Southern Jutland to Copenhagen where it was issued as a morning paper. Evidence is to hand that as early as March 1939 the German security police applied to Fritz Clausen for information (on the Jew question).

After the occupation the "Fædrelandet" gradually became entirely financed by the Germans.

d. <u>German Infiltration in Southern Jutland</u>.

Southern Jutland must, of course, become an especially fertile field for the German infiltration policy on account of the local minority which felt itself nationally attached to Germany and which ideologically had gradually been entirely won for Nazism. Any minority within the boundaries of a country will constitute a risk of fifth column activities on the part of such minority. During the occupation it thus appeared that the organization of the German minority - which amounted to about 30.000 inhabitants - to an ever-increasing extent placed itself at the disposal of the occupation authorities. Even prior to the occupation German citizens as well

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as German-minded Danish subjects had in a number of cases been disclosed as spies for the German intelligence service, and after 1933, when the Nazi party machinery was set up in Northern Sleswig, an intelligence organization was established which subsequently during the occupation worked direct for the German intelligence service. Of still greater interest is perhaps the whole cultural and economic infiltration commenced by the German state already in the years just after 1920. Even if Germany doubtless has counted on being able, in case of need, to make use of the German population element in Northern Sleswig as a fifth column, the infiltration that took place was not a phonomenon directly connected with the occupation on April 9th, 1940, nor with the special nazistic power policy. The infiltration policy was based on the pan-German idea and followed the lines laid down in 1928 for the work for "Germany abroad" in general.

As regards the German purchases of land in Southern Jutland may be mentioned the institution "Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang". This institution was founded in 1926 at a meeting in the German Ministry for the Interior for the purpose of rendering loans to farmers in Northern Selswig, principally to German farmers. It was financed by a secret fund under the "Deutsche Stiftung". This fund administered to a great extent such grants as did not partake of the character of actual subsidies but were to be regarded as loans. The grave agricultural crisis in the middle of the twenties had engendered much dissatisfaction in Southern Jutland, and the Germans tried to exploit this dissatisfaction by placing loans at the disposal of distressed farmers, who would thus realize that Germany was their sole salvation. The money was made available by the German Government and through devious channels by the interposition of various banks, such as the "Höfebank" of Kiel, German bankers in Switzerland and a German banker at Amsterdam, the Germans passed it on to

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Denmark. The object was not solely that of assisting German farmers in riding out financial difficulties but also of making an advance by acquiring land from Danish hands and securing land for a German colonization. In two memoranda to the German Government in 1926, "Denkschriften über den Kampf um den Boden in Nordschleswig" ("Memoranda on the Struggle for the Soil in Northern Sleswig"), the then German representative in the Danish parliament explained that the objects of the propaganda by the German minority supported by great monetary grants from the German Government must be to establish a basis for a prospective frontier revision the idea of which must never be given up. By this propaganda Germany achieved a stiffening of the German element of the population. It was, however, difficult to procure a sufficient number of young farmers to take over the farms, whose owners could not continue, and in time "Vogelgesang" had on hand about 90 farms which had to be operated by managers. For the Danish community it was a great disadvantage to have German capital invested in Danish land. A total of some 8-10 Mill.Kr. was placed at the disposal of the credit institution.

As the German Nazi party had its SA, the North Sleswig party had its SK (Schleswigsche Kameradschaft). The members were trained in field sports and firing practice, a cavalry unit and sanitation column were organized, and there are many indications that the SK was intended to be used for civil war purposes. The activities of the organization were intensified to a marked extent after 1940.

In a similar way as the SK was related to the SA, the "Deutsche Jugendschaft Nordschleswig" was related to the "Hitlerjugend" and the "Deutsche Mädchenschaft Nordschleswig" to the "Bund deutscher Mädchen" in Germany. The Youth work was carried on along the same lines and a close contact existed between the youth leaders of the minority and the "Reich" youth leaders at Berlin.

Among the German social institutions in Southern

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Jutland two deserve special mention. The socalled "Wohlfahrtsdienst" at Tinglev (established in 1929) was the central body for an extensive social work. Before the war a great number of children was sent northward from Germany by this central. The institution maintained a number of sick-nursing centres, the purpose of which was of a typical national character. The second institution was the "Deutsche Selbsthilfe" which was established in 1935.

In other words, it was quite a comprehensive organization that existed in Southern Jutland. Within all fields of community life organizations existed that made it possible for the administration to permeate the entire minority with the Nazi spirit. The national-socialistic discipline of the minority dictated that immediately on the occupation the leaders placed the entire organization and all its institutions at the disposal of the German military and civil authorities without regard whatever to the duties of the members towards the Danish Government whose subjects they were.

In the first instance the Germans were especially interested in procuring labour. Through the office of "Deutsche Berufsgruppen Nordschleswig" labour from the whole of Southern Jutland was directed to German activities north of the frontier. Their knowledge of Danish made the pro-German North Sleswigers especially suitable for work on air fields and in workshops in Denmark. Many served as watchmen and firemen and several as interpreters. The pro-German members could always obtain wellpaid work, and at the beginning the labour office endeavoured to make Danish parents send their children to German schools by offering them well-paid work.

The party organization was also at disposal when in the autumn of 1944 labour was to be provided for the digging of tank ditches in Southern Jutland, and numerous members of

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the minority have more or less directly been in the service of the Gestapo.

As minority organizations in all manners were at the disposal of the Germans, thus also the German newspaper "Nordschleswigsche Zeitung" became a medium for German propaganda.

II.

ENTERING INTO TREATIES WITHOUT MEANING TO OBSERVE THEM.

After President Roosevelt's appeal of 14th April, 1939, to Hitler and Mussolini asking them if they were willing to give an undertaking that the German and Italian armed forces would not attack a number of specified states, among others Denmark, and immediately after Hitler's speech in the German Reichstag on 28th April, 1939, which was caused thereby, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs approached the Danish Minister in Berlin asking if Denmark was willing to conclude a Non-Aggression Treaty with Germany. On 17th May, 1939, the Danish Government answered through the Minister in Berlin that Denmark was willing to enter into negotiations on a Non-Aggression Treaty which expressed the will of the two countries not to use force against each other.

In pursuance of the negotiations which thereafter took place in Berlin the Treaty was signed in Berlin on the 31st of May, 1939, with the following text and signature-protocol:

Article I.

The Kingdom of Denmark and the German Reich will in no circumstances resort to war or to any other form of violence against each other.

Should a third party take action of the kind designated in Paragraph 1 against one of the parties to the Treaty, the other party to the Treaty will in no way support such action.

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Article II.

This Treaty is subject to ratification and the ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin as soon as possible.

The Treaty comes into force with the exchange of the ratifications and shall remain in force from that date for a period of ten years. In case of the Treaty not being denounced by one of the contracting parties at the latest one year before the expiration of this period, its validity is prolonged for a further ten years. The same applies to the subsequent periods of time.

Protocol.

At the signing to-day of the Danish-German Treaty the two parties confirm that they agree to the following:

A support in the sense mentioned in article I, section 2, of the Treaty on the part of the contracting party not taking part in the conflict does not occur when the conduct of that party is consistent with the general rules of neutrality. Thus the continuance of the normal exchange and transit of goods between the contracting party not taking part in the conflict and the third power will not be regarded as an unwarranted support.

The instruments of ratification were exchanged in Berlin on the 24th of June, 1939, whereby the Treaty came into force.

It will be noted that the military occupation of Denmark which took place in April 1940 is, in the strictest sense, inconsistent with the text of the Treaty and the basis on which it was made.

III.

LAUNCHING WARS OF AGGRESSION.

On the 9th of April, 1940 at 4.20 hours the German Minister appeared at the private residence of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air Attaché of the Legation. The appointment had been made by a telephone call from the German Legation to the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4 o'clock the same morning. The Minister said at once, that Germany had positive proofs

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that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in Denmark and Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark against this. For this reason German soldiers were now crossing the frontier and landing at various points in Zealand including the port of Copenhagen; in a short time German bombers would be over Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb until further notice. It was now up to the Danes to prevent resistance as any resistance would have the most terrible consequences. Germany would guarantee Denmark territorial integrity and political independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal government of Denmark, but wanted only to make sure of the neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of the German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the war.

The Minister brought with him a long memorandum (ultimatum) with a detailed statement of reasons and a document ("Aufzeichnung") in 13 points on the rules which had to be followed for the safeguarding of the German Wehrmacht. These 13 points specified the measures which the Germans considered necessary. The most important ones were appeals to the people and the armed forces in Denmark to refrain from resistance and to the armed forces to collaborate with the German officers. The Danish forces would retain their arms as long as their attitude would allow it. Coast defences etc. were to be handed over intact; information about mine barriers was to be given, and a blackout to be introduced; means of communication were to be kept in operation, communications with foreign countries were to be temporarily suspended; the press and the broadcasting service were not to carry any military news which had not been approved by the German Wehrmacht. The broadcasting service was to be available for announcements from the Wehrmacht etc.

The memorandum (ultimatum) mentioned above reads as follows:

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"Entgegen dem aufrichtigen Wunsche des deutschen Volkes und seiner Regierung, mit dem englischen und französischen Volke in Frieden und Freundschaft zu leben und, trotz des Fehlens jedes vernünftigen Grundes zu einem gegenseitigen Streit haben die Machthaber in London und Paris dem deutschen Volke den Krieg erklärt.

Mit der Entfesselung dieses von ihnen seit langem vorbereiteten, gegen den Bestand des Deutschen Reiches und die Existenz des deutschen Volkes gerichteten Angriffskrieges haben England und Frankreich den Seekrieg auch gegen die neutrale Welt eröffnet.

Indem sie zunächst unter völliger Missachtung der primitivsten Regeln des Völkerrechtes versuchten, die Hungerblockade gegen deutsche Frauen, Kinder und Greise zu errichten, unterwarfen sie zugleich auch die neutralen Staaten ihren rücksichtslosen Blockademassnahmen. Die unmittelbare Folge dieser von England und Frankreich eingeführten völkerrechtswidrigen Kampfmethoden, denen Deutschland mit seinen Abwehrmassnahmen begegnen musste, war die schwerste Schädigung der neutralen Schiffahrt und des neutralen Handels. Darüber hinaus aber versetzte dieses englishce Vorgehen dem Neutralitätsbegriff an sich einen vernichtenden Schlag.

Deutschland seinerseits ist gleichwohl bestrebt gewesen, die Rechte der Neutralen dadurch zu wahren, dass es den Seekrieg auf die zwischen Deutschland und seinen Gegnern liegenden Meereszonen zu beschränken suchte. Demgegenüber ist England in der Absicht, die Gefahr von seinen Inseln abzulenken und gleichzeitig den Handel Deutschlands mit der neutralen Welt zu unterbinden, mehr und mehr darauf ausgegangen, den Seekrieg in die Gewässer der Neutralen zu tragen. In Verfolg dieser echt britischen Kriegführung hat England in immer steigendem Masse unter flagrantem Bruch des Völkerrechtes kriegerische Handlungen zur See und in der Luft auch in den Hoheitsgewässern und Hoheitsgebieten Dänemarks und Norwegens vorgenommen.

Deutschland hat diese Entwicklung von Beginn des Krieges an vorausgesehen. Es hat durch seine innere und äussere Wirtschaftspolitik den Versuch der britischen Hungerblockade gegen das deutsche Volk und die Abschnürung des deutschen Handels mit den neutralen Staaten zu verhindern gewusst.

Dies liess in den letzten Monaten immer mehr den völligen Zusammenbruch der britischen Blockadepolitik zu Tage treten.

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Diese Entwicklung, sowie die Aussichtslosigkeit eines direkten Angriffs auf die deutschen Westbefestigungen und die in England und Frankreich stetig wachsende Sorge vor den erfolgreichen deutschen Gegenangriffen zur See und in der Luft haben in letzter Zeit in erhöhtem Masse dazu geführt, dass beide Länder versuchen, mit allen Mitteln eine Verlagerung des Kriegsschauplatzes auf das neutrale Festland in und ausserhalb Europas vorzunehmen. Dass England und Frankreich hierbei in erster Linie die Territorien der kleinen europäischen Staaten im Auge haben, ist der britischen Tradition entsprechend selbstverständlich. Ganz offen haben die englischen und französischen Staatsmänner in den letzten Monaten die Ausdehnung des Krieges auf diese Gebiete zum strategischen Grundgedanken ihrer Kriegführung proklamiert.

Die erste Gelegenheit hierzu bot der russisch-finnische Konflikt. Die englische und französische Regierung haben es in aller Öffentlichkeit ausgesprochen, dass sie gewillt waren, mit militärischen Kräften in den Konflikt zwischen der Sowjet-Union und Finnland einzugreifen und dafür das Gebiet der nordischen Staaten als Operationsbasis zu benutzen. Allein der entgegen ihren Wünschen und Erwartungen erfolgte schnelle Friedensschluss im Norden hat sie gehindert, schon damals diesen Entschluss durchzuführen. Wenn die englischen und französischen Staatsmänner nachträglich erklärt haben, dass sie die Durchführung der Aktion von der Zustimmung der beteiligten nordischen Staaten abhängig machen wollten, so ist das eine grobe Unwahrheit. Die Reichsregierung hat den dokumentarischen Beweis dafür in Händen, dass England und Frankreich gemeinsam beschlossen hatten, die Aktion durch das Gebiet der nordischen Staaten gegebenenfalls auch gegen deren Willen durchzuführen.

Das Entscheidende ist aber folgendes: Aus der Haltung der französischen und englischen Regierung vor und nach dem sowjetrussisch-finnischen Friedensschluss und aus den der Reichsregierung vorliegenden Unterlagen geht einwandfrei hervor, dass der Entschluss, Finnland Hilfe gegen Russland zu bringen, darüber hinaus noch weiteren Plänen dienen sollte. Das dabei von England und Frankreich in Skandinavien mitverfolgte Ziel war und ist vielmehr:

1.) Deutschland durch die Besetzung von Narvik von seiner nördlichen Erzzufuhr abzuschneiden und

2.) durch diese Landung englisch-französischer Streitkräfte in den skandinavischen Länder eine neue Front zu errichten, um Deutschland flankierend von Norden her an-

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greifen zu können.

Hierbei sollen die Länder des Nordens den englisch-französischen Truppen als Kriegsschauplatz dienen, während den nordischen Völkern nach alter englischer Überlieferung die Übernahme der Rolle von Hilfs- und Söldnertruppen zugedacht ist. Als dieser Plan durch den russisch-finnischen Friedensschluss zunächst durchkreuzt worden war, erhielt die Reichsregierung immer klarer davon Kenntnis, dass England und Frankreich bestimmte Versuche unternahmen, um ihre Absichten alsbald in anderer Form zu verwirklichen. In dem ständigen Drang, eine Intervention im Norden vorzubereiten, haben denn auch die englische und französische Regierung in den letzten Wochen ganz offen die These proklamiert, es dürfe in diesem Krieg keine Neutralität geben und es sei die Pflicht der kleinen Länder, sich aktiv am Kampf gegen Deutschland zu beteiligen. Diese These wurde durch die Propaganda der Westmächte verbreitet und durch immer stärker werdende politische Druckversuche auf die neutralen Staaten unterstützt. Die konkreten Nachrichten über bevorstehende Landungsversuche der Westmächte in Skandinavien häuften sich in letzter Zeit immer mehr. Wenn aber überhaupt noch der leiseste Zweifel an dem endgültigen Entschluss der Westmächte zur Intervention im Norden besthen konnte, so ist er in den letzten Tagen endgültig beseitigt worden: Die Reichsregierung ist in den Besitz von einwandfreien Unterlagen dafür gelangt, dass England und Frankreich beabsichtigen, bereits in den allernächsten Tagen überraschend bestimmte Gebiete der nordischen Staaten zu besetzen.

Die nordischen Staaten haben ihrerseits den bisherigen Übergriffen Englands und Frankreichs nicht nur keinen Widerstand entgegengesetzt, sondern selbst schwerste Einbrüche in ihre Hoheitsrechte ohne entsprechende Gegenmassnahmen geduldet.

Die Reichsregierung muss daher annehmen, dass die Königlich Dänische Regierung die gleiche Haltung auch gegenüber den jetzt geplanten und vor ihrer Durchführung stehenden Aktionen Englands und Frankreichs einnehmen wird. Aber selbst wenn die Königlich Dänische Regierung gewillt wäre, Gegenmassnahmen zu treffen, so ist die Reichsregierung sich darüber im klaren, dass die dänischen militärischen Kräfte nicht ausreichen würden, um den englisch-französischen Aktionen erfolgreich entgegentreten zu können.

In dieser entscheidenden Phase des dem deutschen Volke von England und Frankreich aufgezwungenen Existenzkampfes

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kann die Reichsregierung aber unter keinen Umständen dulden, dass Skandinavien von den Westmächten zum Kriegsschauplatz gegen Deutschland gemacht und das dänische Volk, sei es direkt oder indirekt, zum Kriege gegen Deutschland missbraucht wird.

Deutschland ist nicht gewillt, eine solche Verwirklichung der Pläne seiner Gegner untätig abzuwarten oder hinzunehmen. Die Reichsregierung hat daher mit dem heutigen Tage bestimmte militärische Operationen eingeleitet, die zur Besetzung strategisch wichtiger Punkte auf dänischem Staatsgebiet führen werden. Die Reichsregierung übernimmt damit während dieses Krieges den Schutz des Königreiches Dänemark. Sie ist entschlossen, von jetzt ab mit ihren Machtmitteln den Frieden im Norden gegen jeden englisch-französischen Angriff zu verteidigen und endgültig sicherzustellen.

Die Reichsregierung hat diese Entwicklung nicht gewollt. Die Verantwortung hierfür tragen allein England und Frankreich. Beide Staaten verkünden zwar heuchlerisch den Schutz der kleinen Länder. In Wahrheit aber vergewaltigen sie diese, in der Hoffnung, dadurch ihren gegen Deutschland gerichteten, täglich offener verkündeten Vernichtungswillen verwirklichen zu können.

Die deutschen Truppen betreten den dänischen Boden daher nicht in feindseliger Gesinnung. Das deutsche Oberkommendo hat nicht die Absicht, die von den deutschen Truppen besetzten Punkte als Operationsbasis zum Kampf gegen England zu benutzen, solange es nicht durch Massnahmen Englands und Frankreichs hierzu gezwungen wird. Die Deutsche militärischen Operationen verfolgen vielmehr ausschliesslich das Ziel der Sicherung des Nordens gegen die beabsichtigte Besetzung norwegischer Stützpunkte durch englisch-französische Streitkräfte.

Die Reichsregierung ist überzeugt, dass sie mit dieser Aktion zugleich auch den Interessen Dänemarks dient. Denn diese Sicherung durch die deutsche Wehrmacht bietet für die skandinavischen Völker die einzige Gewähr, dass ihre Länder nicht während dieses Krieges doch noch zum Schlachtfeld und zum Schauplatz vielleicht furchtbarster Kampfhandlungen werden.

Die Reichsregierung erwartet daher, dass die Königlich Dänische Regierung und das dänische Volk dem deutschen Vorgehen Verständnis entgegenbringen und ihm keinerlei Widerstand entgegensetzen. Jeder Widerstand müsste und würde von den eingesetzten deutschen Streitkräften mit

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allen Mitteln gebrochen werden und daher nur zu einem völlig nutzlosen Blutvergiessen führen. Die Königlich Dänische Regierung wird deshalb ersucht, mit grösster Beschleunigung alle Massnahmen zu treffen, um sicherzustellen, dass das Vorgehen der deutschen Truppen ohne Reibung und Schwierigkeiten erfolgen kann.

In dem Geiste der seit jeher bestehenden guten deutsch-dänischen Beziehungen erklärt die Reichsregierung der Königlich Dänischen Regierung, dass Deutschland nicht die Absicht hat, durch ihre Massnahmen die territoriale Integrität und politische Unabhängigkeit des Königreiches Dänemark jetzt oder in der Zukunft anzutasten."

The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was completely without foundation; there was no possibility of anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested against the violation of Denmark's neutrality which according to the German Minister's statement was in progress. The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the King and the Prime Minister, and further observed that the German Minister knew, as everybody else, that the Danish armed forces had orders to oppose violations of Denmark's neutrality so that fighting presumably already took place. In reply the German Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent, not least to avoid air bombardment.

The military action against Denmark was commenced at the following hours:

On 9th April, 1940 at 4.00 hours 2 landing vessels were reported inward bound for the Copenhagen harbour. At 4.10 hours German war-ships entered the harbours of Korsør and Nyborg. Between 4.10-4.15 hours German war-ships commenced hailing Danish war-ships in the Greater Belt. At 4.10 hours German troops crossed the frontier at Tønder. At 4.15 hours German troops crossed the frontier at Krusaa. At 4.20 hours a German landing took place at Middelfart. Almost simultaneous

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ly the Germans landed at Gedser by stealing into the harbour in a cattle export steamer. At Masnedø and at Aalborg parachutists were landed. German aircraft attacked the Danish troops at the Værløse airfield, and everywhere in Denmark the German air force took possession of the Danish air space.

From this it will be seen that the German military aggression of Denmark was launched even before the German Minister had arrived at the residence of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs to communicate the demands of the German government to him. Disregarding all international rules and the barest regard to fair and decent behaviour, the German war machine was launched in order to place the Danish Government under coercion. Not till the Danish soldiers had fought for one hour in South Jutland could the Minister for Foreign Affairs reach Amalienborg to inform the King and his colleagues of the actual intentions of Germany. During the negotiations with the King at Amalienborg intense shooting was heard from the palace square at the same time as German aircraft at intervals were flying low over the palace.

As a further characterization of the conduct of Germany it may be stated that the German Minister on April 8th at 15.30 hours had called on the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Ministry. He expressed on that occasion that he feared the consequences the mine layings would have for Norway, and that it might be imagined that these consequences in some way or another might affect Denmark, he hoped that Denmark in such a case would show an understanding attitude. The German Minister emphasized strongly that his anxiety was of a purely personal nature; he had neither instructions nor/other information. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs observed that he could not imagine that there could exist any cause for violations of Denmark's neutrality and that it was known to everyone that the military forces had orders to oppose such violations. It had, the Minister for Foreign

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Affairs continued, been discussed for some time to call up certain units for training purposes and that the question of carrying these call-ups into effect might now suggest itself. In reply the German minister expressed that call-ups in the present situation would be the most unfortunate thing that might happen. From his personal view he had to advise against it. Such a step might be misunderstood in Berlin with regard to Denmark's attitude to the conflict about Norway.

When the German aircraft flew in over Denmark in the morning of April 9th the following proclamation signed by the head of the invasion forces, General Kaupisch, was dropped from the bombers:

> "Without cause and contrary to the sincere wish of the German Government and the German people of living in peace and friendship with the English and French peoples, the potentates of England and France declared war on Germany last year in September.
>
> Their intention was and is, where possible, to seek decisions in theatres of war which are in out-of-the-way places and therefore not so dangerous to France and England, hoping that it would not be possible to Germany to muster sufficient strength against them.
>
> For this reason England has, inter alia, continually violated Denmark's and Norway's neutrality and their territorial waters.
>
> She tried continuously to make Scandinavia a theatre of war. There being apparently no further pretext at hand after the Russo-Finnish peace, England has now officially declared and threatened that she will no longer tolerate German merchant shipping within Danish territorial waters in the North Sea or in the Norwegian waters. She declared that she would herself do the policing of these waters. As a last step she has made complete preparations for a surprise occupation of all the necessary strongholds on the Norwegian coast. The greatest war-monger of all ages, Churchill, who already in the first World War worked to the disaster of all mankind, expressed openly that he was not willing to be detained by "legal decisions or neutral rights on scraps of paper".
>
> He has prepared the attack on the Danish and the Norwegian coasts. Some days ago he was appointed

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responsible head of all British warfare.

The German Government has till now watched the measures this man has taken, but it cannot tolerate that a new theatre of war is now created at the desire of the Anglo-French war-mongers.

The Danish and the Norwegian Governments have known of these attempts months ago.

Nor is their attitude any secret to the German Government. They are neither willing nor able to offer any effective resistance to the English invasion.

Therefore Germany has decided to forestall the English attack and with her own forces to take over the protection of the neutrality of the Kingdoms of Denmark and Norway and defend it for the duration of the war.

It is not the intention of the German Government to create a stronghold for herself to be used in the war against England, it has only the purpose to prevent that Scandinavia is made into a battle field for the extension of the English war operations.

For this reason strong German armed forces have since early this morning occupied the most important military objectives in Denmark and Norway. These measures are at present being made the subject of agreements between the Government of the German Reich and the Royal Danish Government. These agreements are to ensure the continued existence of the kingdom, the maintenance of army and navy, respect for the liberty of the Danish People, and the absolute security of the future independence of this country.

Till these negotiations have been concluded it must be expected that the army and the navy will understand this; it is also expected that the people and all municipal authorities are sensible and show their good intention by refraining from all kinds of passive and active resistance. It would be of no use and be broken by all available forces. All military and municipal authorities are therefore requested to get in touch with the German commanders at once.

The people is called upon to carry on the daily work and to see that quiet and order are maintained!

From now on the German army and navy will see that the country is secure against English aggressions."

The verbal protest which the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs had made to the German Minister in the morning

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was the same day formed into the following note to the German Minister:

"Die königlich dänische Regierung hat sich mit dem Inhalt der mir heute Morgen von Ihnen übermittelten Schriftstücke bekannt gemacht. Sie hat davon Kenntnis genommen, dass das Betreten des dänischen Bodens von deutschen Truppen nicht in feindseliger Gesinnung erfolgt ist, sowie dass die deutsche Reichsregierung nicht die Absicht hat, durch ihre Massnahmen die territoriale Integrität und politische Unabhängigkeit des Königreichs Dänemark jetzt oder in der Zukunft anzutasten.

Nach Empfang dieser Mitteilung hat sich die dänische Regierung in der gegebenen Lage dazu entschlossen, die Verhältnisse hier im Lande unter Berücksichtigung der erfolgten Besetzung zu regeln. Sie erhebt jedoch gegen diese Verletzung der Neutralität Dänemarks ihren ernsten Einspruch."

IV.

AFTER INVASION, TERRORIZATION, ECONOMIC SPOLIATION ETC.

During all the years of oppression the Germans committed acts of terror against the population, a terror which increased in extent as the collapse drew nearer. The largest and most painful terror actions were the disarming of the Danish Army and Navy on 29th August, 1943, the deportation of certain groups of the population, as the Communists and the Jews, and the arrest and the deportation to Germany of a great part of the Danish Police on 19th September, 1944. After the arrest of the police the Danish population was at the mercy of the Germans and it was only owing to the discipline and the solidarity of the people that peace and quiet was maintained in the country.

The number of Danish citizens who lost their lives as a result of the German occupation total 3006, including 1281 sailors, 797 killed by clearing murders, shooting incidents, and Schalburgtage (sabotage instituted by the Germans for terror purposes), 450 who died in German concentra-

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tion camps, 113 executed after German court-martial, 13 killed on 9th April, 1940, 11 killed at the bombardment of Burmeister & Wain on 27th January, 1943, 26 killed on 29th August, 1943, the explosion catastrophe at the harbour of Aarhus on 4th July, 1944 claimed 28 victims, the bombardment of the Gestapo head quarter at Aarhus on 31st October, 1944 also 28, the bombardment of the Gestapo head quarters at Copenhagen on 21st March, 1945, 143 victims, the bombardment of the Gestapo head quarters at Odense on 17th April, 1945, 8 victims, and otherwise killed as a result of bombardment or similar actions 108. These painful losses and privations the Danish State is now trying to remedy by compensations to the victims of the occupation period.

As to the acts of terrorization the chief police officer at the investigation department of the Copenhagen police has stated the following in a report of August 28, 1945:

"I consider that it has been established through the preliminary examinations of the below mentioned representatives of the German occupation authorities in Denmark,
the former German "Reichsbevollmächtigte" in Denmark
Dr. Werner Best,
the former German Police General in Denmark,
Günther Pancke, and
the former head of the German Security Police in Denmark,
Otto Bovensiepen,
that the German authorities, in Germany as well as in Denmark, have committed crimes in Denmark of the categories mentioned below, which might be brought before the International Military Tribunal for major war criminals:

A. Deportations.
B. Counter Terrorism,
C. Torture.

A. <u>Deportations</u>.

With regard to deportations, besides a number of individuals, the following 3 categories are involved:

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1. Communists.
2. Jews.
3. The Danish Police.

A. 1. Communists.

The deportation of the Communists, who were already interned, took place on October 2nd, 1943, in the period when the Germans had declared a state of military emergency, having deposed the Danish Government and disarmed the Danish armed forces. The German army general, von Hanneken, was therefore the highest authority responsible for everything that happened in this country. About this action Dr.Best has stated that it was taken on the initiative of circles in Berlin without his knowing for certain which persons were at the back of it, but he was of the opinion that it was persons within the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt", of which Dr.Kaltenbrunner was in charge at the time. Best states that he himself had had no share in the deportation of the Communists and that he even protested against it. When the action took place he did not act in his official capacity on account of the state of military emergency. The action itself is said to have been in charge of the then head of the German Security Police, Dr.Mildner. Neither Pancke nor Bovensiepen were in Denmark when the Communists were deported.

A.2. Jews.

The rounding up of the jews took place in the night between 1st and 2nd October, 1943, and their deportation followed immediately. About the action against the jews Dr.Best explains also that this was planned by circles in Berlin. Without knowing just which persons caused the action, he believes that it was those in charge in "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" and the Party itself, and he mentions especially Rosenberg. Also this action took place during the state of military emergency and while Dr.Best did not function. It was also in this case Dr.Mildner who was in charge of the action itself. As stated above neither Pancke nor Bovensiepen were in Denmark at the time.

A.3. The Danish Police.

The deportation of the Danish police took place on September 19th, 1944. About this Pancke has stated that he and General von Hanneken agreed that the Danish police constituted a considerable danger for the occupation

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power in case of invasion. These two therefore planned between them that the police should be disarmed, and that part of the police force should be deported. Pancke submitted the plan to Himmler through his adjutant, Graurock, who went to Berlin and from this place got into connection with Himmler in the latter's headquarters per telewriter. Himmler thereafter gave a written consent to the plan and stated in his letter, that Hitler had agreed to the plan. Bovensiepen admits that his advice was sought about the outlines of the plan. Without having been previously consulted Dr.Best was, according to Pancke's statement informed of the plan on September 12th, when Himmler's written agreement to the plan had arrived - Best however so far denies any knowledge of the plan before it was carried out. The action was in charge of Pancke and Bovensiepen, who had negotiated with Kaltenbrunner and Möller from "Reichssicherheits-hauptamt", and assistance was rendered by the armed forces in accordance with an arrangement with von Hanneken.

B. Counter Terrorism.

Pancke and Bovensiepen have in almost identical statements explained that in the autumn of 1943, before Pancke and Bovensiepen were transferred to Denmark, Hitler and Himmler with the consent of Kaltenbrunner had ordered that counter terrorism should be commenced in Denmark to combat sabotage and murders of members of the occupation forces or pro-German Danes. The counter terrorism should partly consist of retaliatory and deterrent murders partly of blasting and other destruction of Danish property. The counter terrorism was to be in charge of the then head of the German Security Police in Denmark, Dr. Mildner. On 1st November, 1943, when a regular German Police force was established, Pancke took over his post in Denmark and assumed thereby the supreme responsibility for all the German police in Denmark. As the resistance against the occupation power did not decrease during the last months of 1943, von Hanneken, Best and Pancke were summoned to a conference at Hitler's headquarters where, besides Hitler, Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, and the generals Keitel, Jodl, Schmundt and Scherff, and von Sonnleithner from the German Foreign Office presumably were present. Having expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of affaires in Denmark, Hitler ordered a new distinctly and intensified counter terror in Denmark, and at a later

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meeting between Pancke and Himmler the latter enjoined this order on Pancke.

When they returned to Denmark Hitler's order was passed on to Bovensiepen for execution and during the following period the German police, partly with the assistance of Danes, brought about a comprehensive counter terrorism, whereby many Danes were murdered and many Danish properties were destroyed. The objects of the counter terrorism were selected by Best, Pancke and Bovensiepen jointly - Best denies however to have taken part. As assistance in the actual execution of the counter terrorism a small group of particularly suited Germans were summoned to Denmark. The group was to begin with in charge of Obersturmbannführer Schwerdt (fictitious name Peter Schäffer) and later Hauptsturmbannführer Issel (fictitious name Wandenburg) from Skorzenis Section of "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" in Berlin.

C. Torture.

According to the evidence of numerous Danes the German police and its Danish assistants have made use of torture of a particularly outrageous nature against a large number of Danish victims who had been arrested by the German police. Pancke denies having had any knowledge of the torture, but Bovensiepen has admitted that a standing order from the supreme headquarters of the German police directs that torture should be used for the eliciting of certain facts, and Bovensiepen admits that in two cases he has himself ordered the use of torture in Denmark, viz. against Professor Mogens Fog and Lt.Col. Ejnar Tiemroth, and that he has otherwise passed on the order about torture to the divisional head in the German Security Police, Dr.Hoffmann. Best has stated, that, in his position, he had no authority to prevent torture."

During the occupation the country was being exploited at a steadily increasing rate. This may be best illustrated by the development of the Expenditure of the German Armed Forces (I) and of the variations of the Clearing balance (II).

I.

The Expenditure in Denmark of the German Armed Forces.

When the German army invaded Denmark it declared that it would make no demands for supplies, but would cause all the requisite supplies to be sent up from Germany. The neces-

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sary expenditure for wages payable to the military forces, military constructions etc. would be paid in German emergency money ("Reichskreditkassenscheine"), which was to be redeemed by Danish banks. When "Danmarks Nationalbank" protested against the circulation of foreign notes in Denmark, the German authorities withdrew the "Reichskreditkassenscheine" and demanded that an account (the "Wehrmacht"-account) should be opened with "Danmarks Nationalbank", at the same time they pledged themselves to draw only such amounts as were necessary for paying the soldiers etc. This undertaking was not complied with and particularly as the surrender approached the German army drew large amounts which were distributed both among members of the armed forces and among German civilians.

On the "Wehrmacht"-account the following amounts were drawn:

1940	a monthly	average	of	43	mill.	Kr.
1941	-	-	-	37	-	-
1942	-	-	-	39	-	-
1943	-	-	-	83	-	-
1944	-	-	-	157	-	-
Jan.-April 1945	-	-	-	187	-	-

During the first five days of May, 1945, 65 mill.Kr. were drawn.

The total amount drawn on the account was abt. 4830 mill.Kr.

The heavy increase in "Wehrmacht" expenditure in 1943, 1944 and 1945 is due partly to the fact that the "Wehrmacht" was no longer able to get its supplies from Germany, partly to the extensive fortification-works started by the "Wehrmacht", partly to lack of discipline, during the last years of the occupation period, within the German Commissariat and other agencies responsible for the control of expenditure. Therefore abuses took place.

Danish authorities continually lodged protests in Copenhagen and in Berlin, but although the "Wehrmacht" was compelled through the civil authorities to submit to Danish

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price control it did not prove possible in practice to carry out such control. There was especially no possibility of controlling the use made of the large amounts drawn in cash.

II.

The Clearing Balance.

From the 9th of April, 1940 and throughout the war every effort was made by the Danish authorities to counteract the developments towards an increasing Danish credit balance, but in vain.

Thus the Danish Clearing claims increased as follows:

31st Dec.	1940:	388,8 mill.Kr.
- -	1941:	784.4 - -
- -	1942:	1,062.2 - -
- -	1943:	1,915.8 - -
- -	1944:	2,694.6 - -
30th Apr.	1945:	2,900.0 - -

As German plunder and looting (in a wider sense) in Denmark may be mentioned the German seizure and removal on the 29th of August, 1943, of all supplies belonging to the Danish Army and Navy, consisting of lorries, horses and other means of transportation, fixtures, furniture, clothing and other effects to a total amount of 850 mill.Kr. On the other hand the Danish authorities are under the impression that no looting has taken place in respect of privately owned financial items.

The Danish Government intend shortly, through the proper channels, to put forward war reparation claims to an amount of abt. 11,600 mill.Kr.

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

25 OKT. 1945

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SUPPLEMENT TO PART IV ("TERROR") OF DANISH MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER, 1945, CONCERNING THE GERMAN WAR CRIMINALS TO BE TRIED BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COURT.

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THE FIRST YEARS OF THE OCCUPATION.

The Danish Government having realized that continued resistance against the German aggression would be futile and having felt compelled to cease defensive action and submit to the German Occupation as an accomplished fact, the Danish King, Government and Parliament were able during the first years of the Occupation to maintain their functions and by negotiations safeguard the interests of the Danish population against the German demands. Denmark thus succeeded in avoiding the appointment of a National-Socialist Quisling Government. The German Legation subsidized the leader of the Danish National-Socialist party, Frits Clausen, with considerable sums of money in accordance with instructions from Dr.Luther in the "Auswärtiges Amt", and no doubt also held out prospects of his assuming power. In November 1942 the Germans demanded a reconstruction of the Danish Government on the pretext that the then Prime Minister must be held responsible for a telegram from His Majesty the King to Hitler which had offended the Führer by its brevity, and Foreign Minister v.Ribbentrop demanded that National-Socialists should be included in the Government. This demand was definitely refused, and it was dropped by Dr.Best, who had just relieved Minister v.Renthe-Fink as German Plenipotentiary in Denmark. After the general election to the Danish "Folketing" (Lower House) in March 1943 had resulted in an enormous majority for the democratic coalition parties, the National-Socialist party suffering a crushing defeat, the Germans apparently abandoned the idea of converting Denmark to National-Socialism.

During the first years of the Occupation isolated acts of violence were committed by members of the German "Wehrmacht" against civilian Danes, and the encroachments of the German

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authorities on Danish affairs in many fields, despite the assurances given at the time of the occupation, led to an ever-increasing indignation and unrest in the population. Sabotage on a rapidly increasing scale from the end of 1942 gave rise to German intervention against Danish subjects, who in some cases were brought before German courts-martial. In certain instances the persons convicted were taken to Germany to serve the sentences of hard labour passed upon them, but with few exceptions they had all been returned before August 29th, 1943.

The first death sentence passed by court-martial was executed on August 29th, 1943.

This interference in Danish jurisdiction was keenly felt as a gross encroachment, but terror actions of the kind practised by the Germans in the rest of occupied Europe did not commence in Denmark until after August 29th, 1943, and after the introduction of German security police.

On the other hand the terror in this country in certain respects assumed a unique and particularly violent character, and it increased rapidly in extent as the collapse drew nearer. The largest and most painful encroachments were the disarming of the Danish Army and Navy on the 29th August, 1943, the deportation of certain groups of the population, such as Communists and Jews, and the arrest and deportation to Germany of a substantial part of the Danish police on the 19th September, 1944. Especially sinister, however, was the counter-terrorism organized by the Germans in the form of murder of innocent persons and destruction of property for the purpose of deterring the Danish Resistance from continuing sabotage against objects of vital importance to the German war machine, and the killing of persons who as German informers constituted a mortal danger to the Resistance Movement. By this

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counter-terror an exceptional uneasiness was created in the population, particularly after the removal of the Danish police. None could feel secure against the persecutions of the German murderers. Senseless killings and acts of destruction were the order of the day.

THE TURNING-POINT:

As stated above, the 29th of August, 1943, became the decisive turning-point as regards the conduct of the Germans in Denmark.

At the beginning of August a strike broke out at Esbjerg, and in the course of the month similar strikes occurred in various provincial towns, particularly Odense. Clashes occurred between German soldiers and Danish civilians, and German military forces were set in against the civil population. Towards the end of the month a similar development took place at Aalborg. In consequence of these events, the German Plenipotentiary, Dr. Best, was on August 24th, 1943, summoned to Berlin, whence he returned with far-reaching demands on the Danish Government. As the Government refused to submit to these demands, the German action - against which preparations had been made in anticipation of a Danish refusal - was carried out on August 29th, 1943. At most places the Germans, without previous notice, attacked the limited forces of the Danish Army and Navy which, by agreement with the Germans, had been retained in service. In the course of these actions 19 men of the Army and 7 of the Navy were killed. The personnel of the Army and Navy were interned, and the equipment - in so far as it had not been destroyed or concealed by the Danes - was seized. The Commander in Chief of the German forces in Denmark proclaimed a state of military emergency "im Sinne der Haager

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Landkriegsordnung" which state of military emergency lasted until October 5th, 1943. In connection with the events of the 29th August, 1943, 16 Danish civilians were killed. The personnel of the Army and Navy were discharged from the services at the beginning of October, 1943.

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GERMAN POLICE IN DENMARK.

Prior to August 29th, 1943, there had been no actual German police in Denmark apart from a few policemen attached to the Legation, for which reason all investigations on the part of the Germans against Danish subjects had been constituted as courts-martial, carried out principally by personnel of the Army (Abwehr). Now, however, SS police and "Polizeigerichte" were introduced into the country. The leader of the German police in Denmark was "Obergruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei", Günther Pancke, who arrived on November 1st, 1943.

On the other hand, "SS-Standartenführer", Dr. Mildner, had already arrived in Denmark on September 16th, 1943, as "Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und der Sicherheitsdienst in Dänemark". He did not, however, appear in public until October 6th, 1943. On January 6th, 1944, he was replaced by "SS-Standartenführer" Bovensiepen, presumably because Mildner had not sufficiently carried out the orders received from Berlin concerning the use of terror methods. The organization of the German machinery in Denmark and its relation to the leaders in Berlin will appear from the 3 exhibits enclosed. The Plenipotentiary, General v.Hanneken and General Pancke were independent of each other and each of them acted in accordance with orders received from his superiors. They were, however, to consult on important measures, but were under no obligation to comply with representations from either of the

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other parties. As Chief of the "Sicherheitspolizei", Bovensiepen was subordinate to Pancke, the "Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer", but nevertheless received direct orders within his domain from the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" in Berlin (Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner).

DEPORTATIONS.

As in all other occupied countries the SS police primarily turned against Communists and Jews and, in contravention of international law, deported them.

At 3 a.m. on August 29th, 1943, even before the state of emergency had been proclaimed, German troops occupied the Horserød camp, where 248 Communists were interned. They had been interned there by the Danish Government after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, at the demand of the Germans, and to prevent the Germans already at that time from interning them under more severe conditions or possibly deporting them to Germany. 98 of the internees had a chance to escape but 150 fell into the hands of the Germans. On the 2nd October, 1943, they were transported by ship to Germany, where they were consigned to concentration camps - most of them in the camp at Stutthof near Danzig. More than 20 died either in the camp or subsequently as a result of their sufferings there. Concerning the deportations, Dr. Best has stated that they took place on the initiative of circles in Berlin and that he has no certain knowledge who were at the back of them, but is of the opinion that the persons responsible were in the "Reichsicherheitshauptamt" of which Dr.Kaltenbrunner was in charge at the time. Best states that he himself had no share in the deportation of the Communists and that he even protested against it. When the action took place he did not act in his official capacity on account of the state of military emergency. Dr. Mildner, the

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then head of the German security police, is said to have been in charge of the action itself. Neither Pancke nor Bovensiepen was in Denmark when the Communists were deported.

During the state of military emergency deportations of Danish Jews also took place.

The rounding up of the Jews occurred in the night between 1st and 2nd October, 1943, and their deportation followed immediately. About the action against the Jews Dr.Best explains also that this was planned by circles in Berlin. Without knowing exactly which persons were responsible for the action, he believes they were people in charge of the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" and the "Parteikanzlei der N.S.D.A.P.", and he asserts that it took place during the state of military emergency and while he was not functioning. In this case also Dr.Mildner was in charge of the action itself. As stated above neither Pancke nor Bovensiepen was in Denmark at the time. In the practical execution of the action Dr. Mildner may have been assisted by a certain Herr Eichmann from the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt". Mildner is said personally to have been against the action and to have made representations against it to the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" without results. The division of the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" which had to do with the action (Amt IV) was then under the charge of "Gruppenführer" Müller. Through indiscretions in German quarters it had become known in advance that an action against the Jews was imminent. Consequently only a relatively small number of the Jews in Denmark fell into the hands of the Germans, and many fled to Sweden. 8.000 - 9.000 persons were registered as arrested, deported or having fled. As a principal rule Jews married to Aryans or half-Jews were released. The deportees - believed to be 475 in number - were transported by ship and cattle trucks under

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inhumane conditions to the town of Theresienstadt in Bohemia-Moravia. As the Danish administration saw to it that Red Cross parcels and clothing were sent them at Government expense, they did not quite share the terrible fate of many of their race from other countries. Thus, no Danish Jew was sent to the gas chambers of the German concentration camps - probably on account of the incessant representations made by the Danish administration both in Denmark and Berlin on behalf of the deportees. As, however, many of the deportees were elderly people who had been unable or unwilling to flee, the number of deaths at Theresienstadt was considerable, namely 53.

Even while Dr. Mildner was Chief of the security police still more deportations took place: On the 23rd November, 1943, 31 young men, of whom 19 were residents of Odense, were taken to a concentration camp in Germany for "continued illegal, communistic activities" or "for subversive activities (hostile action against the occupying power)". Several of these young men had only participated in street commotions in Odense, or the like, There had been no trials and no sentences had been passed. The Danish authorities could obtain no details concerning the grounds for the deportation, which in fact was a purely arbitrary terror action.

In quite the same way 58 Danish subjects (and 4 resident foreigners or stateless persons) were on December 19th, 1943, deported from Odense, Kolding, Randers and Fredericia, to concentration camps in Germany. After Bovensiepen had relieved Mildner, the following further deportations took place: On January 18th, 1944, - 78; on June 28th, 1944, - 13; and on July 2nd. 1944, - 17. Finally, on September 15th, 1944, 201 Danish subjects who had been interned by the Germans in a camp in the Frøslev plantation close to the Danish-German frontier, were taken to Germany.

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The greatest deportation and perhaps the most outstanding infamy committed by the Germans in Denmark was, however, the deportation of about 2.000 Danish policemen and frontier guards, which took place on the 19th September, 1944. About this Pancke has stated that he and General von Hanneken agreed that the Danish police constituted a considerable danger to the occupying power in the event of an invasion. These two therefore planned between them that the Danish police should be disarmed, and that part of the police force should be deported. Pancke submitted the plan to Himmler through his adjutant, Graurock, who went to Berlin and from there communicated by teleprinter with Himmler in the latter's headquarters. Himmler then gave a written consent to the plan, stating in his letter that Hitler had agreed to it. Without having been previously consulted, Dr.Best, according to Pancke's statement, was informed of the plan on September 12th, after Himmler's written agreement had arrived. Best, however, has so far denied any prior knowledge of it. The action was in charge of Pancke and Bovensiepen, who had negotiated with Kaltenbrunner and Müller from "Reichssicherheitshauptamt", and assistance was rendered by the armed forces in accordance with an arrangement with von Hanneken.

At 11 a.m. on the date mentioned the Germans caused a sham air raid warning to be sounded. Immediately afterwards German police soldiers armed with tommy-guns forced their way into Police Headquarters at Copenhagen and into the various Copenhagen police stations. Owing to the element of surprise only slight resistance was offered, and indeed resistance against such superior forces would have been futile. Some policemen were killed. Similar actions were carried out all over the country. At most places, however, the policemen were dismissed as soon as they had been disarmed. Only in Copenhagen

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and in the large provincial towns were they retained and - partly by ship and partly by goods-vans - taken southwards to Germany. The same proceedings were used against the corps of frontier guards on the Danish-German frontier. A number of the police officers and elderly policemen were allowed to leave the ship before its departure. The policemen were taken via Neuengamme to the concentration camp at Buchenwald. They were quartered there under indescribably insanitary conditions; a very large proportion of them were taken ill; about 100 policemen and frontier guardsmen died and several still bear traces of the sojourn. That no greater number perished must be ascribed solely to the fact that the Danish Foreign Office succeeded in obtaining permission to take a number of the sick by ambulance to the Frøslev camp in Denmark, while after a few months the remainder, in response to urgent representations from Denmark, were tranferred to prison camps.

The deportations continued, however. A total of 6,104 Danes were taken to German concentration camps or prisons in Germany - including the number mentioned above. 583 died in German concentration camps or prisons or as a consequence of their stay there.

GERMAN COURTS-MARTIAL."SS-UND POLIZEIGERICHT". EXECUTIONS.

Although deportations to Germany without trial or conviction thus formed an important part of the German campaign against the Danish Resistance Movement, this was not their only method. Numerous Danes have had to spend shorter or longer periods in German imprisonment in the camp at Frøslev or in German prisons in Denmark, namely about 6.880 and 4.000 respectively. In the Frøslev camp employees of the Danish prison service were in charge of the catering, and for that reason, among others, conditions there were tolerable.

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All Danes who, by courts-martial or "SS- und Polizeigericht" had been sentenced to imprisonment or hard labour for more than three months after deduction of the time of arrest pending trial, were taken to German prisons to serve their sentences. However, not many sentences were passed by the German courts in Denmark. The German police system could not cope with the work of preparing the many cases for trial, and for that reason the German police preferred to intern the accused in Denmark or Germany simply on the basis of the charge preferred.

A number of capital sentences were, however, passed, and as pardons were granted only in exceptional cases, most of these sentences were executed. During the Occupation altogether 113 persons were executed under sentences passed by German courts-martial or the "SS- und Polizeigericht".

To these must be added the cases in which Danish patriots were killed during fights with the German police or "killed while attempting to escape". At the present time it is impossible to state the exact number. Several cases of "killing while attempting to escape" were simply sham executions without trial. As an especially abominable example may be cited that of 11 young Danes who had been arrested by the Germans for sabotage or transportation of arms, and who were all killed on August 9th, 1944, while in transit from the "Shell House" (the headquarter of the German police) at Copenhagen, by being shot through the back of the neck. According to information received they were on their way to Germany. The possibility exists that they had been picked out for execution as a reprisal for the killing of a former Danish policeman, Ment, who was in the employ of the German security police, and who had been active in their arrest. At any rate it has been proved that they were taken into a side road at

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Roskilde and by a provocateur sent with them encouraged to attempt to escape after the had been ordered to get out of the vehicle, and that thereupon they were all killed by shots at close quarters.

HOSTAGES.

There was no shooting of hostages in Denmark, where on the whole the hostage system was but little used. However, on the 29th August, 1943, a number of prominent persons all over the country were arrested and held interned for a couple of months as hostages for a quiet development, but nothing happened to them. The taking of hostages has also been used as a means of compulsion, wives and relatives of persons wanted having been arrested in order to force such persons to give themselves up. Under an "Erlass" issued by Himmler all relatives of persons acting as parachutists were to be arrested and kept interned, and this was done in some cases. Further the Germans in certain cases used "prophylactic reprisals". Thus it may be mentioned that they placed prisoners from the Frøslev camp in the foremost coaches of military transport trains, so that in the event of sabotage against the train or the railway line the prisoners would be killed. This did not happen, however, in any instance. It was also a kind of hostage system when the Germans publicly announced that the fate of arrested saboteurs would depend on the course of future events, on which the prisoner could, of course, have no influence.

COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT.

Collective punishment was used in several instances, especially during the state of military emergency, when fines running into millions of Kroner were imposed on municipal authorities in connection with acts of sabotage or the killing

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of German soldiers.

TORTURE.

In numerous cases the German police and their Danish helpers used torture in order to force prisoners to confess or give information. This fact is supported by irrefutable evidence. In the most frequent cases the torture consisted of whipping or blows with a stick or rubber truncheon, but also far more flagrant forms of torture were used including some which will leave lasting injuries. Bovensiepen has stated that the order to use torture in certain cases emanated from higher authority, possibly even from Göring as Chief of the Prussian "Geheime Staatspolizei", but at any rate from Heydrich. The instructions were to the effect that torture might be used to compel the person tortured to give information that might serve to disclose subversive organizations directed against the German Reich, but not for the purpose of making the delinquent admit his own deeds. It must not be possible in any other way to attain the intended result, and it was a prerequisite that quick action should be necessary in order to prevent facts from being covered up. The means were prescribed, namely a limited number of strokes with a rod. Bovensiepen does not remember whether 10 or 20 strokes was the maximum limit. An officer from the criminal police (Kriminalkommissar, Kriminalrat) was to be present, and also, when circumstances required, a medical officer.

The above instructions were amended on several occasions as regards minor details and were at certain intervals to be brought to the attention of all members of the criminal police. Bovensiepen has stated that he personally gave orders for the use of torture in two instances in Denmark: against a member of the Freedom Council, Professor Mogens Fog, and against Lieutenant-Colonel Ejnar Thiemroth, and that other-

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wise he passed the instruction concerning torture on to the divisional leader of the German security police, Dr. Hoffmann. Best has declared that his official capacity did not authorise him to prevent the use of torture. Pancke has stated that he did not know that torture was used.

COUNTER-TERROR.

As mentioned above, the most drastic features of the German terror were the perpetration of the so-called clearing murders, the killing of innocent citizens as a reprisal when one of the Germans or their helpers had fallen in an action against the Resistance Movement, and the "Schalburgtage", i.e. sabotage against objects in which the Germans were not interested, but the loss of which for some reason would be strongly felt by the Danish population, the aim being partly to take revenge, partly to make the sabotage committed by the Danish Resistance Movement unpopular among the population. This method was used on express orders from Berlin.

Pancke and Bovensiepen have made almost identical statements to the effect that Hitler and Himmler in agreement with Kaltenbrunner at the beginning of December 1943, before the transfer to Denmark of Pancke and Bovensiepen, had ordered that counter-terror was to be applied in Denmark to combat sabotage and the murder of members of the occupying forces and pro-German Danes. The counter-terror was to consist partly of retaliation and deterrent murders on intellectuals and persons who might be suspected of backing the sabotage, for instance financially, and partly of the blowing up or demolition of Danish property. The counter-terror was to be in charge of the then Chief of the German security police in Denmark, Dr. Mildner, who like Dr. Best was informed of the order by Pancke when on December 10th, 1943, he returned to Denmark. The counter-terror did not, however, begin at once,

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as the three wished to postpone its use as much as possible, and at any rate wanted a discussion with Himmler, Ribbentrop and Kaltenbrunner before commencing it. As, however, the resistance against the occupying forces did not decrease during the last month of 1943, von Hanneken, Best and Pancke were summoned to a meeting at Hitler's headquarters on the 30th December, 1943, where, besides Hitler, the following persons were probably present: Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, Generals Keitel, Jodl, Schmundt, and Scherff, and from the German Foreign Office, von Sonnleithner. After having expressed his dissatisfaction with developments in Denmark, Hitler gave new and definite orders for an increased counter-terror in Denmark, and at a subsequent meeting between Himmler and Pancke, the former further impressed the order on Pancke.

On his return to Denmark Pancke transmitted Hitler's order to Bovensiepen for execution, and in the period following, the German police, to some extent assisted by Danish collaborators, practised an extensive counter-terror in which many Danish subjects were killed and many Danish buildings destroyed. The objects of the counter-terror were selected by Bovensiepen, partly on consultation with Pancke and Best, though the latter denies having participated. To assist in the actual perpetration of the counter-terror, a small group of specially suitable Germans was transferred to Denmark. This group was first under the charge of "Obersturmbannführer" Schwerdt (cover name Peter Schäffer) and later on of "Hauptsturmbannführer" Issel (cover name Waldenburg) from Skorzeni's division in the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" in Berlin. The reason for this was a demand from Mildner, who did not want to carry out "Gegenterror" with his local staff.

According to the latest information 835 persons were killed during the Occupation by clearing murders, gunfire and

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Schalburgtage. It is not possible to distinguish with any amount of accuracy between the different groups. It is a fact that not all clearing murders were committed by the "Peter" group directed by Bovensiepen, and that several murders were committed by other groups attached to the Germans. According to confession made by members of the "Peter" group, that group did, however, perpetrate 81 murders, 14 attempted murders, and Schalburgtage in 118 cases. Further, in about a score of cases its members assisted in "official" demolitions. This term covers cases in which the German security police openly blew up a villa, dwelling house, or the like, claiming that it had been used as a haunt by saboteurs, for the storing of arms or explosives, etc. Bovensiepen has admitted having ordered 20 of the murders and 4 of the attempted murders and does not deny that 59 of the other murders and 14 of the attempted murders may have been committed according to his orders or with his approval. He also admits being responsible for most of the Schalburgtage actions. Among the murders for which Bovensiepen will not assume responsibility, is the killing of the clergyman-poet Kaj Munk, committed on January 5th, 1944. Bovensiepen did not come to Denmark until January 6th, 1944, and this murder must therefore - like the attempted murders in December 1943 on Ole Bjørn Kraft and Aksel Møller, two members of the Danish Parliament, and Christian Hansen Dam, an editor - presumably have been committed on orders given by Mildner prior to his departure from Denmark.

No attempt will be made to give a full summary of the many murders and demolitions, but a few examples of the German "Gegenterror" may be cited: Among the objects the Germans attempted to blow up were: The House of the University Students Club, the "Studentergaarden", the buildings of various Sports and Athletic Clubs, the Korsør Glassworks, newspaper offices -

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especially in the provincial towns, the building of the Danish physicians' and surgeons' club ("Domus Medica"), the pleasure garden "Tivoli", the Royal Porcelain Factory, the Ranum Seminary, Match Factories, the building of the Tradesmen's Society at Aarhus, the head office of the East-Asiatic Company at Copenhagen, the "Odin/Tower at Odense, The Tuborg Breweries, the Randers Theatre, the City Hall of Aarhus, besides numerous business premises, factories, etc. In this connection reference is made to the enclosed photographs. ./.

According to a statement prepared, 2 complete annihilations of buildings in this way took place in 1943, 155 in 1944, and 112 in 1945 up to May 5th, 1945.

The damage thereby caused runs into many mill.Kroner.

The terror actions on a large scale directed simultaneously against a number of business premises and houses in the main streets of different towns, must be specially mentioned: Thus on May 14th, 1944, in Copenhagen; on November 9th, 1944, in Odense; on the 12th November, 1944, in Aarhus; on the 13th November, 1944, in Vejle; on the 22nd February, 1945, in Aarhus; and in March, 1945, in Randers. In many of these cases human lives were lost. Losses of Life were particularly heavy in the case of the six bomb outrages committed against railway trains. Especially bloody was an outrage against a train at Lillerød on July 27th, 1944. As an especially glaring case of counter-terror typical for the selection of the object may be mentioned that on April 19th,1944, a bomb was thrown at a crowded tramcar in the Vesterbrogade in Copenhagen, where many persons were killed or wounded. At the place where this outrage was committed, a man who had acted as chauffeur to Dr.Best had been killed, and this killing was to be avenged upon the quite innocent tramcar passengers. In a similar way one or more random persons were in many cases killed on the spot on which a German or German collaborator had lost his

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life.

German terror on a somewhat larger scale also occurred during the people's strike in the last few days of June and the first days of July, 1944. On account of a curfew imposed by the Germans from 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. strikes broke out which developed into an all-embracing general strike in Copenhagen. The Germans declared a state of military emergency, closed the town and shut off the water, gas and power supply, and tried to enforce the curfew by indiscriminate shooting in the streets. Not only police soldiers but also members of the "Peter" group were in activity. During the few days the strike lasted 102 persons were killed and more than 600 wounded. It is characteristic, that a very large percentage of the casualties were people remaining indoors in their homes.

The Germans had no doubt hoped to get the Resistance Movement out into the open in connection with the strike, so that it might be broken. As they did not succeed, subsequent attempts were made. Thus, in the days before the 29th August, 1944, the Germans tried to provoke such a situation by disseminating false proclamations of a strike on the occasion of the anniversary of the German assault. Some poster-hangers who were arrested by the police, stated that they had received the posters at the barracks of the Schalburg Corps from a "Hauptmann"Meyer, probably, the same man who, under the supervision of General Pancke, organized the intelligence service of the Schalburg Corps. All effects of this German provocation were, however, successfully averted.

It has been stated above that the action on the 19th September, 1944, may be considered the most infamous of the misdeeds of the Germans in this country. It was so not only because it was the largest concerted deportation of persons

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not convicted or capable of being convicted of any guilt, but fully as much because a whole country, including a large capital city like Copenhagen, was thereby, in an unsettled time, entirely deprived of police forces. It followed as a matter of course that the Danish police not included in the action dared not and would not perform their duties after what had happened and while their comrades were kept imprisoned in German concentration camps under frightful conditions. The Germans for their part were not interested in combating ordinary crimes. On the contrary, they increased the general lawlessness by introducing a so-called "Hilfspolizei" (Hipo) to assist the German police. This "Hilfspolizei" was recruited from the lowest strata of the Danish population, many of them being criminals. For their acts up to the day of capitulation - indiscriminate shooting, assaults, murders, torture, and unofficial executions - the German authorities who used them and tolerated their activities must bear the full responsibility.

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, November 30th.1945.

II

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Erläuterung zu dem umstehenden Plan der Befehlsverhältnisse der deutschen Dienststelle in Dänemark während der Besetzung.

Volle Linien bedeuten volle Befehlsgewalt.

Unterbrochene Linien bedeuten eingeschränckte Befehlsgewalt:

Der Wehrmachtbefehlshaber hatte gegenüber dem Kommandierenden Admiral Skagerak und dem Kommandierenden General der Luftwaffe nur Befehlsgewalt für den Kampfeinsatz, während diese Stellen im übrigen ihre Befehle von ihren Oberkommandos erhielten.

Der Chef der Ordnungspolizei gab dem Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei in Dänemark nur Befehle in Personal- Ausrüstungsfragen u. s. w., während alle Dienst- und Einsatzbefehle vom Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer gegeben wurden.

Der punktierte Bogen bedeutet, dass der Reichsbevollmächtigte alle Forderungen des Wehrmachtbefehlshabers gegenüber den Dänischen Staat zu vertreten hatte, ohne diese Forderungen jedoch abändern zu können. War er mit einer Forderung nicht einverstanden, so musste er dies dem Auswärtigen Amt berichten, das sich mit dem Oberkommando der Wehrmacht in Verbindung setzte.

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Appendix 2.



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

*) indtil Januar 1945 Stedfortræder for Bovensiepen

**) efter Januar 1945 „ „ „

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Illustrations to Section IV ("Terror") in the Danish Memorandum of October 1945 concerning the German war criminals to be brought before the International Military Tribunal.

1. A 32-year old and an 18-year old Dane have under German ill-treatment been whipped with leather straps.

2. 2 varieties of handcuffs or torture manacles often used by Gestapo when examining prisoners. A sudden pull will fracture the prisoner's wrists.

3. Thumb-screws were favourite torture instruments if Gestapo could not make a prisoner speak.

4. A man at the Frøslev camp was branded with a red-hot iron several times in the course of 24 hours.

5. The glergyman and author Kaj Munk was killed by 5 pistol shots. The corpse bears clear signs of ill-treatment.

6. As a part of the campaign for the destruction of the Danish film industry the large theatre, the "Kinopalæet" at Copenhagen, was destroyed by a bomb explosion. The damage amounts to abt. 2 mill.Kroner.

7. A German-Danish terrorist gang blasts under German orders the building of the newspaper "Fyns Tidende" at Odense.

8. Bomb outrage against the Jutland express train near Hobro whereby 10 Danes were killed and 36 wounded.

9. Delayed-action bomb explodes in railway train outside Lillerød station. 3 passengers were killed, 15 wounded, including 9 seriously wounded.

10. The monument at Frederiksberg for the Jewish author Meir Goldschmidt has been upset and the swastika painted on the base.

11. The building of the conservative party "Borgernes Hus" at Copenhagen was blasted by a German-Danish gang.

12. A German-Danish terrorist gang blasts under German orders the old building of the newspaper "Fyens Stiftstidende" at Odense.

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13. The Royal Yacht Club pavilion at Langelinie, Copenhagen, was blasted by a terrorist gang "as a blow in the face of the upper classes". The damage is estimated at abt. 400.000 Kroner.

14. The people's strike on 30th June, 1944, aroused spontaneously as a protest against the German provocations. It was met by German terror, including the barring of all roads leading out of town and the stopping of gas, water, and electricity supplies to Copenhagen. The picture shows the demonstrators' barricade at "Nørrebrogade" decorated with Danish, British, and Soviet-Russian flags.

15. The concert hall at the Copenhagen "Tivoli" destroyed.

16. The head office of the East Asiatic Company at Copenhagen destroyed. The damage amounts to 3 mill.Kroner.

17. The house at Vestre Boulevard, Copenhagen, where the American film companies had offices destroyed by explosion and fire.

18. The medical profession's house, "Domus Medica" at Copenhagen was blown up as a revenge for the liquidation of an informer by the Resistance Movement.

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Exhibit
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Filed Jan 21, 1946

RF 115

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